FIRST DIVISION
|
AGUSTIN
VITALISTA, ORLANDO VITALISTA, LEONARDO VITALISTA, AURELIO VITALISTA, LAZARO VITALISTA, PEDRO MEMPIN, and ENRIQUE
DELA CRUZ, Petitioners, - versus - FLORENTINO
BANTIGUE PEREZ, JOSE BANTIGUE PEREZ, JACINTO BANTIGUE PEREZ, ERNESTO BANTIGUE
PEREZ, FELICISIMA BANTIGUE PEREZ, BELEN BANTIGUE PEREZ, and JOSELITO PEREZ
TUANO Respondents. |
|
G. R. No. 164147 Present: PANGANIBAN,
CJ,
Chairman, YNARES-SANTIAGO AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO,
SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: |
x
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
NAZARIO, J.:
This is a
Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to set aside a
Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals dated 12 January 2004 allowing the petitioners and the
private respondents to file their respective applications for one-half of Lot
No. 2195, Psd-52045 of the Buenavista Estate, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, while
crediting the previous payments made by Ester Bantigue
as part of the appraised value of the land.
The Court of Appeals in its assailed Decision affirmed the Decision[2]
of the Office of the President dated
The land in
question, registered as Lot No. 2195, with an area of 222,147 square meters,
located in San Ildefonso, Bulacan,
was once part of Hacienda Buenavista, a property
owned by the Roman Catholic Church and administered by the San Juan de Dios Hospital. In
1940, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 539 was enacted authorizing the President of
the Philippines to acquire private lands and to subdivide the same into home
lots or small farms for resale to bona
fide tenants, occupants and other qualified individuals.[5]
Benito Bantigue was one of the tenants of Hacienda Buenavista who had a lease contract with the hospital. Upon his death in 1929, his leasehold right
was inherited by his daughter, Ester Bantigue.[6] When the government offered to resell parcels
of land from Hacienda Buenavista to its tenants,
Ester Bantigue partially paid for the disputed lot
under Official Receipt No. 0135880 dated
From 1945
to 1960, the children of Ester Bantigue, private
respondents herein, worked on the landholding in question. In 1961, petitioner Agustin Vitalista worked on the land as a tenant of the Bantigues, per agreement with respondent Jose Perez, acting
as administrator of the said land. The
other petitioners were subsequently allowed to occupy and cultivate the land.[9]
Three years
before her death, Ester Bantigue carried out
contradictory acts in connection with the disposition of the landholding. On
On
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Order is hereby issued
1. DECLARING the heirs of Ester Bantigue no better right to acquire Lot No. 2195, Psd-52045 of the Buenavista Estate, San Ildefonso, Bulacan;
2.
DECLARING
3. FORFEITING all payments made by Ester Bantigue over the aforecited lot in favor of the government.[14]
On appeal,
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform reversed and set aside the Order issued by the
Regional Director, pronouncing that the provisions of LTA Administrative Order
No. 2, issued in 1956, and the DAR Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1990,
have no retroactive effect on the implied contract between Ester Bantigue and the government in 1944, in accordance with the
constitutional prohibition against the impairment of contracts[15]. However, the implied contract is subject to
limitations imposed by the Kasunduan she later executed.[16] The dispositive portion of the said Order
dated
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, Order is hereby issued giving due course to the instant appeal
filed by the petitioner, thus setting aside the Order dated
A Motion for Reconsideration was
filed by the petitioners, but the same was denied by the DAR for lack of merit
in an Order dated
The
petitioners then filed an appeal before the Office of the President, but on
The
petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was subsequently denied
on
The
petitioners filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of
Court. In a Decision dated
The Court
of Appeals declared that since the provisions of LTA Administrative Order No. 2
requiring personal occupation and cultivation came into effect after Ester Bantigue purchased her land, these cannot be applied
retroactively without violating the Constitutional proscription against
impairing the obligations of contracts.[23]
The Court
of Appeals also ruled that the entirety of her acts should be taken into
account in interpreting Ester Bantigue’s intent in
executing the waiver; in such a case, her intent in executing the waiver was a
desire to benefit the petitioners without sacrificing her children’s right to
the land.[24]
The Court
of Appeals likewise held that there was a contract to sell between the
government and the private respondents’ predecessor-in-interest. Although it was only partly paid, the
contract was not cancelled. Thus, the
full implementation of the transfer while taking into account the Kasunduan or
agreement with the petitioners was correct and just.[25]
The petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision dated 12 January 2004 that was
rendered by the Court of Appeals. On
Hence this
petition, wherein the petitioners raised the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT, THE
HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MISERABLY FAILED TO RESOLVE WHETHER
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE HAD TRANSMISSIBLE RIGHTS OVER THE
II.
WHETHER OR NOT, THE
HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF
THE HONORABLE DAR SECRETARY, THAT IS, EQUAL DIVISION OF THE
III.
WHETHER OR NOT,
EQUAL DIVISION OF THE
Respondent
failed to file a memorandum, despite due notice and sufficient time that this
Court allowed them. Accordingly, the
petition was decided based on the records and the pleadings already before this
Court.
In this case, petitioners raised not only questions of law
but also issues of fact in their petition for review. They argued that the Court of Appeals failed
to consider the fact that it is the petitioners, not the private respondents
nor their predecessor-in-interest, who had occupied, possessed and cultivated
the land in question even before the government acquired the Buenavista Estate.[28]
Well-settled
is the rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact,
especially if the factual findings of the Court of Appeals coincide with those
of the DAR, an administrative body with expertise on matters within its
specific and specialized jurisdiction.
Such factual findings can be questioned only if, among other exceptions,[29]
they are completely devoid of support from the evidence on record or the
assailed judgment is based on a gross misapprehension of facts.[30]
In the
present case, there is no reason to disregard the findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals. The factual findings are
borne out by the records and are supported by substantial evidence. The records do not contain any evidence to
support the petitioners’ allegation that they occupied the landholding before
the 1960’s. A party claiming a right
granted or created by law must prove his claim by competent evidence and is
duty bound to prove his allegations and cannot simply rely on the weakness of
the other party’s evidence.[31]
On the
other hand, the private respondents were able to prove that they were bona fide tenants qualified to acquire
subdivided farm lots as provided under Section 1 of C.A. No. 539.[32] They presented a Lease Contract between their
predecessor-in-interest, Ester Bantigue, and the San
Juan De Dios Hospital, as well Official Receipts as
evidence of payments for rent in-arrears and partial payments for the purchase
of the land made in 1944.
Significantly,
the Order issued by the DAR Regional Director dated 9 December 1992 recognizes
that Ester Bantigue is the registered claimant of the
disputed land, while the petitioners are registered tenants of Ester Bantigue over the said land.[33] The Regional Director decreed that the
private respondents’ preferential right to acquire the disputed land was
forfeited for violating the rules against employing tenants, the petitioners,
in accordance with LTA Administrative Order No. 2, and DAR Administrative Order
No. 3, series of 1990.[34] Certifications issued by no less than two
DAR officials affirm Ester Bantigue’s status as the
registered claimant.[35]
Finally,
when the petitioners executed a document entitled Kasunduan with Ester Bantigue in 1977, they necessarily recognized her right to
give them half of her interest in the said land and to keep the other half for
herself. From 1977 to 1993 when the
private respondents brought this case on appeal, the petitioners did not
question the validity of the Kasunduan. Instead,
they filed an application for one-half of the land immediately after the Kasunduan was executed, and not for the entire portion as would have been
the case had there been no one with a superior right to the land.[36]
The
petitioners in this case cannot claim a superior right to acquire the land in
question since they cannot be considered as bona fide tenants
or occupants as provided under C.A. No. 539. A bona fide tenant or occupant is one who supposes that he has a good
title and knows of no adverse claim They were aware of
the private respondents’ prior claim since the registered claimant of the said
land was Ester Bantigue and the petitioners had in
fact been tenants hired by the Bantigues.
In the case
of Fernando Santiago v. Realeza Cruz,[37]
this Court emphasized that where there is more than one claimant or applicant
for the purchase of land acquired under C.A. No. 539, the same law provides for
a rule on preference in favor of a bona
fide tenant:
The next question to be determined refers to the preference that should be observed in the allocation of the lots in dispute among their different claimants which constitutes the root cause of the present controversy x x x. This law is Commonwealth Act No. 539. Section 1 of this Act provides that the home lots into which the lands acquired thereunder are to be subdivided to promote its objective shall be resold at reasonable prices and under such terms and conditions as may be fixed "to their bona fide tenants or occupants or private individuals who will work the lands themselves and who are qualified to acquire and own lands in the Philippines." An analysis of this provision would at once reveal that the intendment of the law is to award the lots to those who may apply in the order mentioned. This enumeration denotes the preferential rights the law wishes to accord to them. Thus, the first choice is given to the bona fide "tenants," the second to the "occupants" and the last to "private individuals."[38]
The
preference in favor of a bona fide
tenant or occupant was thus explained by this Court in the case of Enrique Bernardo v. Crisostomo
S. Bernardo:[39]
The term "bona fide occupant" (admittedly petitioner is not a tenant) has been defined as "one who supposes he has a good title and knows of no adverse claim" (Philips vs. Stroup, 17 Atl. 220,221); "one who not only honestly supposes himself to be vested with true title but is ignorant that the title is contested by any other person claiming a superior right to it" (Gresham vs. Ware, 79 Ala. 192, 199); definitions that correspond closely to that of a possessor in good faith in our Civil Law (Civil Code of 1889, art. 433; new Civil Code, art. 526). The essence of the bona fides or good faith, therefore, lies in honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach another. The petitioner Enrique Bernardo falls short of this standard: for the precarious nature of his occupancy, as mere licensee of respondents, duty bound to protect and restore that possession to its real and legitimate holders upon demand, x x x. That the law, in preferring "bona fide occupants," intended to protect or sanction such utter disregard of fair dealing may well be doubted.[40]
The
Affidavit of Waiver executed by Ester Bantigue in
1977, waiving her right to the entire landholding in favor of the government,
is invalid since the entirety of her acts shows a contrary intent. Waiver is defined as the relinquishment of a
known right with knowledge of its existence and an intention to relinquish it.[41] This Court, in its previous decisions had
emphasized the importance of determining the intent of the parties. In Nielson
& Company, Incorporated v. Leopanto Consolidated
Mining Company,[42]
this Court decreed that, “In the construction and interpretation of a document
the intention of the parties must be sought.
This is the basic rule in the interpretation of contracts because all
other rules are but ancillary to the ascertainment of the meaning intended by
the parties.”
Previous,
simultaneous and subsequent acts of the parties are properly cognizable indicia of their true intention.[43] In this case, Ester Bantigue
first allowed her children to apply for the purchase of one half of the land,
before waiving her rights to acquire it in favor of the government. Within a few months, she finally entered into
an agreement whereby the petitioners were given one-half of her interest in the
land, and the other half was set aside for her and her heirs. Verily, Ester Bantigue’s
intention was to leave one-half of her interest in the subject land to her
heirs. Since Ester Bantigue’s intent has been
sufficiently shown, it must be respected and implemented through whatever
medium is available under our civil law.[44]
Moreover,
this Court also placed significance over the subsequent acts of the parties
involved in connection with a contract or document. In the case of The Spouses Bernabe Africa v. Caltex (Philippines), Incorporated,[45]
this Court stated that, should there be a controversy as to what they really
had intended to enter into, the way the contracting parties do or perform their
respective obligations stipulated or agreed upon should prevail over the name
or title given to the contract.
In this case, the acts of the parties affected
affirmed they understood and accepted that the intention of Ester Bantigue had been to retain one-half of the property for
herself and her heirs, not waive her entire rights to the landholding in favor
of the government. The government never
declared the landholding vacant and open for disposition, which would have been
the case had the waiver been considered valid.
The petitioners applied for and were granted CLTs
by the DAR for only part of Lot No. 2195, Psd-52045[46]. Since the petitioners were occupants of the
same land, they should have applied for CLTs over the
entire parcel of land if they believed that the Waiver executed by Ester Bantigue ceding her rights in favor of the government was valid.
It is
crucial that both petitioners and private respondents had acted in accordance
with the terms of the Kasunduan,
not the Waiver of Ester Bantigue’s rights over the
subject land in favor of the government.
Each party had made their application to purchase only half of the
subject land. Neither the petitioners
nor the private respondents questioned the equal division of the land during
the lifetime of Ester Bantigue nor
for more than ten years thereafter.
The private
respondents alleged in their letter-complaint dated
Moreover,
the petitioners allege that the Kasunduan is void since the government is not a party to an
agreement covering lots which are part of the landed estate. The petitioners further allege that upholding
the agreement would be a clear abdication of the government’s powers to
administer and dispose of lots within landed estates.[50]
There is no
merit in the petitioners’ allegations.
Ester Bantigue’s tenancy rights
over the disputed land has existed since 1929, and she had partially
paid for the said land in 1944. Ester Bantigue did
not infringe upon the government’s powers and authority by giving one-half of
her interest to the said land to the petitioners, whom she had allowed to
occupy and cultivate the land since 1960.
The Kasunduan
or agreement between Ester Bantigue and the
petitioners does not prevent the government from denying the petitioners’
applications for CLTs over half of the disputed land. By issuing the CLTs
in favor of the petitioners, the DAR found nothing wrong with the terms of the Kasunduan.
The Kasunduan executed by the petitioners and Ester Bantigue is a valid contract. Contracts, in general, require the presence of three essential elements:
(1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject
matter of the contract; and (3) cause of the obligation which is established[51]. There is no question that Ester Bantigue and the petitioners voluntarily entered into an
agreement to divide the subject land equally between themselves.
The object of the contract in this case is Ester Bantigue’s
interest as registered claimant over the subject land. Since the Kasunduan is a gratuitous
contract, the generosity or liberality of the benefactor is the cause in such
contracts.
In summary,
the Kasunduan,
which the petitioners and Ester Bantigue executed in
The petitioners likewise questions the
decision of the Court of Appeals for not disqualifying the private respondents
from acquiring the disputed land, since they had violated LTA Administrative
Order No. 2, issued in 1956, and DAR Administrative Order No. 3, Series of
1990, by employing tenants. LTA
Administrative Order No. 2 requires the beneficiary or awardee
of public lands to personally cultivate the landholding. Failure to do so will result in the
cancellation of the Agreement to Sell or the Deed of
Sale between such beneficiary or awardee and the
government, the pertinent provisions stating thus:
Section
24 – Conditions in Agreement to Sell, Deeds of
Section 25 – Violation of the Conditions in the Preceding Section; Its effect – The violation of any of the conditions set forth in the preceding section shall be sufficient ground for the chairman of the Land Tenure Administration to cancel an agreement to sell or deed of sale, and to order the reversion of the lot covered thereby and the forfeiture of all payments made on account thereof to the government.
The same
rule is reiterated in DAR Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1990, which
prescribes the procedure for facilitating the issuance of land titles to
qualified beneficiaries:
|
SITUATION |
|
RECOMMENDED ACTION |
|
2.1 Applicant with OA/CLT |
|
|
|
x x x |
|
|
|
2.1.3 If not actual cultivator/occupant |
|
|
|
a. one who employs tenants prior to full payment of the cost of the lot |
|
Cancel OA/CLT and issue CLOA to actual cultivator /occupant |
The
circumstances of this case are similar to those found in Spouses Conrado Tuazon
v. Hon. Ernesto Garilao,[54]
where the disputed land was also acquired under C.A. No. 539 and the issue
raised was whether the awardee of the land loses his
right to acquire it by allowing other persons to cultivate the land. In the Tuazon case, this Court applied
to an agreement to sell executed in 1960 a specific rule later issued, Land
Authority Circular No. 1, series of 1971, which provides that, “x x x in cases of awards or
agreements to sell issued over land acquired by the government under the
provisions of CA No. 539, where the awardee or promisee dies or is physically incapacitated, or where the
government fails to issue the corresponding deed of sale although the land is
fully paid for, the said awardee or promisee or his successors in interest may enter into
leasehold or labor-management relationship and work the land through lessees or
laborers without being considered as losing occupancy or personal cultivation
of the land.”[55]
A general law and a special law on the same subject should be
accordingly read together and harmonized if possible with a view to giving
effect to both. Where there are two
acts, one of which is special and particular and the other general which, if
standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the
special act, the special must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent
more clearly than that of the general statute and must be taken as intended to
constitute an exception to the rule.[56]
The same principle applies regardless of whether the special
law is passed before or after the general act. Where the special law is later,
it will be regarded as an exception to, or a qualification of the prior general
act; and where the general act is later, the special
statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless
repealed expressly or by necessary implication.[57]
In this case, the general rule requires personal cultivation
in accordance with LTA Administrative Order No. 2 and DAR Administrative Order
No. 3, Series of 1990. However, Land
Authority Circular No. 1, Series of 1971 clearly makes three exceptions on the
personal cultivation requirement in cases where land is acquired under C.A. No.
539: (1) when the awardee or promisee
dies; or (2) when the awardee or promisee
is physically incapacitated; or (3) when the land is fully paid for but the
government fails to issue the corresponding deed of sale. By specifying these
excepted cases and limiting them to three, the said circular recognizes that
outside these exceptions, any deed of sale or agreement to sell involving lands
acquired under C.A. No. 539 should be cancelled in cases where the awardee fails to comply with the requirement of personal
cultivation.
This case falls under one of the exceptions to the
above-cited rule anchored on the ground of physical incapacity. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals
reveal that Ester Bantigue and her children
cultivated the land at the time she made her first installment for the purchase
of the land in 1944 until the time private respondent Jose Bantigue
Perez engaged the services of the petitioners to work on the land sometime in
1960. By that time, the awardee or promisee, Ester Bantigue was already at an age when she was no longer
physically able to work on the land. She
had even appointed her son Jose Bantigue Perez to
manage the said property, and authorized him to engage the services of the
petitioners. Truly then, the private
respondents and their predecessor-in-interest are exempted from the rule
requiring personal occupancy and cultivation due to Ester Bantigue’s
physical incapacity. The Agreement to Sell between Ester Bantigue
and the government executed pursuant to C.A. No. 539 cannot be cancelled on the
ground that other persons or lessees or laborers were allowed to work on the
land. Therefore, Ester Bantigue’s heirs, the private
respondents are not disqualified from acquiring the disputed land. However, their right to acquire it is subject
to the Kasunduan,
dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court
DENIES this petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP NO. 57362 dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice |
WE CONCUR:
Chief
Justice
Chairman
|
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate
Justice |
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
|
Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
|
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBANChief
Justice |
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Mario L. Guarińa III, with Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr.
and Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. concurring. Rollo, pp. 28-34.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 48-53.
[3]
[4]
[5] Rollo,
p. 29.
[6]
[7] CA rollo, p. 49.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Rollo,
p. 30.
[12] Rollo,
p. 30.
[13] CA rollo, p. 24.
The pertinent provisions reads,
as follows:
Section 24 – Conditions
in Agreement to Sell, Deeds of
Section 25 – Violation of
the Conditions in the Preceding Section; Its effect – The violation of any
of the conditions set forth in the preceding section shall be sufficient ground
for the chairman of the Land Tenure Administration to cancel an agreement to
sell or deed of sale, and to order the reversion of the lot covered thereby and
the forfeiture of all payments made on account thereof to the government. (LTA
Administrative Order No. 2 ; 1956)
|
SITUATION |
|
RECOMMENDED ACTION |
|
2.1 Applicant with OA/CLT |
|
|
|
XXX |
|
|
|
2.1.3 If not actual cultivator/occupant |
|
|
|
a. one who
employs tenants prior to full payment of the cost of the lot |
|
Cancel OA/CLT and issue CLOA to actual cultivator
/occupant |
(DAR Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1990)
[14]
[15] CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 10. “No rule impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed.”
[16] CA rollo, pp. 30-31.
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] Rollo,
p. 28.
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] CA rollo, p. 143.
[27] Rollo,
p. 18.
[28]
[29] The exceptions to this rule include the following instances: (1) when the
conclusion is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgement is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) when the findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial courts; (8) when the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10) when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. (Juanita T. Sering v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 137815, 29 November 2001, 371 SCRA 151, 155-156; Maximino Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1163, 1168-1169 (1997).
[30] Charles Joseph U.
Ramos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145405, 29 June 2004, 433 SCRA 177,
182; Graciano Padunan v
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), G.R. No. 132163,
28 January 2003, 396 SCRA 196.
[31] United Airlines,
Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 124110, 20 April 2001, 357 SCRA 99, 107; Domingo R. Catapusan v. Court of Appeals, 332 Phil 586, 592
(1996).
[32] Commonwealth Act No. 539 (1940).
SECTION 1.The President of the Philippines is authorized to acquire private lands or any interest
therein, through purchase, expropriation and to subdivide the same into home lots or small farms for
resale at reasonable prices and under such conditions as he may fix to their bona fide tenants or occupants or to private individuals who will
work the lands themselves
and who are qualified to acquire and own lands in the Philippines.
[33] CA rollo, p. 23.
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37] 98 Phil. 168 (1955).
[38]
[39] 96 Phil. 202 (1954).
[40]
[41] Public
Estates Authority v. Bolinao Security and
Investigation Service, Incorporated, G.R. No 158812,
[42] 125 Phil. 204, 215 (1966).
[43] Florencia Velazquez v. Justo Teodoro,
46 Phil. 757 (1923); Pilar
N. Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, 150-B Phil. 770,
777 (1972).
[44] Adaza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 47354,
[45] 123 Phil. 272, 287 (1966), citing The Shell Company of the Philippines Limited v.
Firemen’s Insurance Company of Newark,
100 Phil 757, 764 (1957).
[46] CA rollo, p. 49.
[47]
[48] Miguela Carillo v. Justimiano
Jaojoco, 46 Phil 957, 960 (1924).
[49] CIVIL CODE. Art. 1390. The
following contracts are voidable or annullable, even
though there may have been no damage to the contracting parties:
(1)
Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a
contract;
(2)
Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation,
undue influence or fraud.
These contracts are binding,
unless they are annulled by a proper action in court. They are susceptible of ratification.
Art. 1391 The action for annulment shall be
brought within four years. x x x.
[50] Rollo,
p. 21
[51] Arturo R. Abalos v. Dr. Galicano S. Macatangay, Jr., G.R. No. 155043,
[52] Phoenix Assurance Company, Limited. v.
[53] Spouses Tiu Peck v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104404,
CIVIL CODE. Art. 1159. Obligations
arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties
and should be complied with good faith.
[54] 415 Phil. 62 (2001).
[55]
[56] Lichauco and Company, Incorporated v. Silverio Apostol, 44 Phil
138, 147 (1922).
[57] Jose
D. Villena v. Hon. Marciano
Roque, 93 Phil 363, 373 (1953).